ILLIQUIDITY AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION BY LOUIS-VINCENT GAVE

Covid came as a shock to the world, but in many cases it is merely accelerating fundamental trends that were already unfolding anyway. The US-China rift, the debasement of western currencies, the de-dollarization of emerging markets, the attempts to replace carbon energy with renewables, the increase in social tensions linked to living in multicultural societies: everything now seems to have gone into hyperdrive.

This probably shouldn’t be a surprise. If there has been one constant theme in Gavekal’s research over the last 15 years or so, it is that we are living in an age of accelerating creative destruction. This idea is the common thread that ties together the books Charles and I have written, from Our Brave New World, through A Roadmap For Troubling Times, to Clash Of Empires, and it is one most clients seem happy to agree with.

And this forces us face-to-face with an almighty capital allocation paradox. As the world changes at an ever-increasing rate, and the future becomes ever more challenging, more and more money pours into private equity funds and other forms of locked-up investments. This is odd. In a world in which the future is increasingly uncertain, surely investors should be avoiding illiquid strategies like the plague, and instead falling over each other to seek shelter in the financial industry’s more liquid offerings? Instead, we are seeing precisely the opposite.

To take one example: a year ago, owning an office building in Midtown Manhattan, London’s Canary Wharf or downtown San Francisco might have seemed as “safe as houses”. But in the age of the unexpected, what was a sure bet yesterday can turn into a certain loser today. Just look at UnibailRodamco-Westfield, one of Europe’s largest office and commercial property landlords. In two years, it has seen its market capitalization collapse from €27bn to €4.2bn. Two years ago, owning commercial and office space seemed like a good idea. Today, it is toxic.

Alternatively, consider an investor who in January 2000 decided that new technologies were bound to change the way we live, work and play, and that the way to play this change was to put capital into the 10 tech companies with a market cap at the time of over US$200bn (figuring that size and scale would be the key drivers of long-term performance). Our investor would have bought Microsoft, Oracle, Intel, IBM, Cisco, Lucent, Ericsson, Nokia, Sun Microsystems and Nortel Networks.

Reinvesting all his dividends, he would have ended up two decades later with one winner (Microsoft), three washes (Oracle, Intel and IBM), three big disappointments (Cisco, Nokia and Ericsson) and three donuts (Lucent, Sun Micro and Nortel). His total compound annual growth rate (dividends included) would have been 1.4%. And he would have missed out on the likes of Amazon (with a November 1999 peak market cap of US$35bn) and Apple (US$23bn in March 2000).

Clearly, in a single generation, the tech world has changed almost beyond recognition, and the companies which offered scale 20 years ago mostly failed to cope with that change despite all the advantages of size (or perhaps because of them?).

This makes investors’ enthusiasm for illiquidity all the more strange. Why, in a world that is changing so fast, would investors rush headlong into illiquid strategies? Why should they so readily give up the opportunity to say: “The world is changing. My portfolio needs to evolve?”

There are two possible reasons: extra income, and extra growth.

In a world in which income is ever-harder to find, giving up liquidity (especially for those who do not need it immediately) in exchange for extra income might seem to make a lot of sense. However, more often than not, the excess income is delivered by gearing up balance sheets. And increasing leverage typically increases fragility. In a time of accelerating creative destruction, rapid societal shifts and growing geopolitical uncertainty, does increasing fragility (by increasing leverage) really make sense?

Gearing up balance sheets might make sense in an environment of structurally falling interest rates. As interest rates fall, asset prices get rerated and the value of equity increases rapidly. Of course, this cuts both ways: once interest rates stop falling and either flatline or rise, gearing, instead of boosting shareholder returns, begins to destroys them.

Not that rising interest rates are needed to destroy shareholder returns. Think again of a hypothetical Canary Wharf* landlord: gearing up the balance sheet to buy buildings whose yields were higher than the interest rates charged seemed like a no-brainer. Then Covid-19 hit, and rent payments stopped. Very quickly, the equity in the business was facing a wipe out. In this context, shouldn’t the Unibail-Rodamco-Westfield faceplant raise questions over the value of the equity in a whole swathe of real estate private equity funds?

I could go on, but it suffices to say that with interest rates at record lows and with the world changing ever more rapidly, accepting illiquidity in return for the promise of increased income seems like a dangerously shortsighted proposition. Once again, investors are picking up pennies in front of steamrollers.

This leaves the prospect of growth as the only reason to accept illiquidity. This can make excellent sense: investors offering entrepreneurs both capital and time to succeed is what capitalism should be all about. And in a world that changes ever more rapidly, the entrepreneur who can adapt, safe in the knowledge that he is backed by investors that are not pressed for time, has an important competitive advantage.

It follows that when looking at the illiquid strategies institutional investors have poured capital into over recent years, there are two key questions to ask:

  • Is the competitive advantage of this strategy derived from some kind of financial engineering?
  • Or does the competitive advantage of this strategy flow from the ability to identify entrepreneurs and business leaders who need capital?**

In a world that is changing ever more quickly, the first type of strategy will become ever riskier. Meanwhile, in a properly functioning capitalist system, investors who are successful at implementing the second type of strategy will continue to be rewarded very handsomely indeed.

https://blog.evergreengavekal.com/illiquidity-and-creative-destruction/

EMs – surge in younger cohorts at the worst time- Macquarie Research

The Growth model for less developed economies for the past two decades was to leverage global demand by utilizing cheap and abundant labor resources and attracting foreign capital and technological knowhow.

It was globalization of the 1850s-1910s that was underwritten by the British capital, industry and navy that offered an opportunity for the US and Germany. By 1913, the level of globalization reached levels that were not again surpassed until the 1990s. Hence, the frequent arguments in 1909-13, that a war in such a globalized world was impossible to contemplate. Th at prediction turned out to be disastrously wrong. The next major globalization phase started in the 1970s but significantly accelerated in 1980s-90s and peaked just before GFC in 2007. This period provided the necessary boost for Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and of course China, and in a different way, Israel and to some extent Thailand and Malaysia. Alas, as discussed in our past notes, this latest period of globalization has now gone into reverse.

The rhetoric has now changed and shifted towards favouring local interests over globalisation.

Similar to the currency trilemma, one cannot have nation states, local politics and globalisation at the same time. Nation states and local politics seems unlikely to disappear and thereby what will be affected is globalisation.

So, globalisation will reverse and create winners and losers. The winners are unlikely to compensate the losers in an acceptable time frame.  Losers tend to concentrate in certain geographies, occupations and racial groups.

In view of the current technological, financial and demographic environment, globalisation is set to reduce further and accelerate the atrophying of supply chains while removing development opportunities for emerging and developing economies.

 So the options for Emerging Markets to accelerate their per capita gdp growth rates are

  1. Size of Domestic Market

Size of local domestic market increases in importance thereby China and India will be at an advantage vis – a-vis Malaysia or Thailand.

  •  Ability of Emerging Market countries to restart respective business cycles –

The ability to combine fiscal and monetary policy to restart domestic cycle depends on level of monetary sovereignty, quality of state institutions, supply side bottlenecks and capacity utilization flexibility.

  • Ability to improve efficiency of non-tradeable sectors and provide structural reform to remove rent seeking vested interests.
  • Emerging Markets ability to embrace the intangible sector as tangibles sector decline. This will require intellectual capital. Building intangibles requires careful nurturing for long time periods.

The above challenges are accelerated by the compounding of significant demographic changes.

In an Industrial age, demographics and urbanisation can become productivity and wealth enhancers. In this world, increase in size of young people accompanied with improvement in human capital and Core infrastructure growth led to growth.

In the new world, where key to productivity growth are no longer humans as need for labour input decreases as proportion of gains from intangible assets rise. The rise on young cohorts and urbanisation would increasingly be associated with poverty, squalor and disease.

Thus, in the Information Age, rapidly rising younger cohorts will likely lead to lower per capita income, less growth and more violence. On the other hand, an ageing population might not excessively strain budgetary or financial systems, as technology and greater fiscal flexibility change this dynamic.

Having fewer people especially young people becomes a positive demographic trend.

The collapse in infant mortality rate in emerging and less developed countries is causing a significant explosion of populations across emerging market countries.

Emerging market population under 15 is likely to exceed 1.8 Bn with most growth coming from outside of China, with Ems ex China cohort passing 1.5 Bn.

On the other younger cohort is going to drop below 200 Mn in more developed economies.

According to the UN database, EMs ex China labour force is likely to grow by 0.5bn in the next ten years and by almost 1bn over twenty years. It is estimated that by 2040, ~72% of the global labour force will be based in less developed economies, excluding China vs 55% in 1990 and 60% in 2010. In other words, less developed economies ex China need to create more than 45m jobs pa.

The avenues for deploying a bulge in working population is being gradually shut down.

Manufacturing employs a large number of low to mid skilled people which Emerging markets have in abundance. Manufacturing also leverages global demand as compared to local demand. Manufacturing also has one of the largest domestic economic multiples i.e. an estimated $3 for every $ of manufacturing.

Technology coupled with anti-globalisation sentiment has reduced the importance of merchandise trade compared to value of services, technology & intellectual capital.

In the last decade non-tariff barriers along with robotics and automation is on the rise. This is reducing demand for labour in labour intensive industries at a time when there is an even more urgent need of jobs.

These trends are already visible, even before full merger of cloud computing, AI and 3D printing, which will further accelerate disintermediation of the supply and value chains while eliminating a large portion of factories and significantly simplifying every product, with production and consumption increasingly residing in the same place.

The importance of services, intangibles compared to merchandise trade is rising.

Services now constitute as much as 1/3 of what is today classified as merchandise trade. If adjusted for the value of digital and intangible services, it is likely that the overall value of services already exceeds value of merchandise trade, even though in purely reported terms, merchandise is ~2.5x larger.

Intangibles do not have the same capacity limitations as tangible assets and offer significant synergies and spill-over effects while maintaining higher pricing power and delivering sustainably higher returns.

It is intangibles that are now the driver of growth and wealth as pricing power and value of tangible assets erodes.

Countries relying on cheap labour and basic commodities will fall behind countries that rely on intellectual capital and intangible assets.

Emerging Markets have relatively less access to intellectual and intangible assets. R&D spending in Emerging markets excluding China is around $130 Billion representing 7% of the worlds total.

At the same time more than 75% of R&D spending globally is spent in developed economies. China has increased its share from 2% in 2000 to 17% in 2018.

In 2017, the less developed economies excluding China had only 3% of the global patents as compared to 85-90% belonging to developed economies. Meanwhile, China’s share increased to 8% from negligible in the year 2000.

Less developed economies, excluding China, currently have just over two million researchers or ~25% of the global total. This compares to almost 2m researchers in China alone, around 2.5m in the EU-28, almost 1m in Japan and 0.5m in Korea.

In most developed economies at least 35%-50% of the private sector GDP is now driven by intangible assets, with the US at the highest level at more than 60%. However, in less developed economies ex China, it appears that intangibles do not exist in any meaningful form. Even in China, estimates point to intangibles being perhaps not much more than 10%-15% of private sector GDP.

The main issue to contend is that currently approximately 2/3 of the worlds population has too much labour which is becoming less important as compared to the resources required for success in the future i.e. intellectual and intangible information age assets.

With, Emerging markets unable to accelerate GDP per capita growth rates significantly over last 6 decades, the future is even more treacherous. Other than a massive Marshall Plan like policy response it is hard to see any other measure that would unleash uncontrollable immigration, social, geopolitical, and healthcare pressures.

Is China in a class of its own ?

The growing deglobalization and technological disintermediation when combined with political backlash against globalization in more developed economies and the rise of geopolitical pressures  seem to suggest that China might transit from being the greatest beneficiary of globalization to becoming its most significant loser.

However, the new information age will favour countries with a significant domestic market and no emerging market comes close to China’s US$5-6 Trillion domestic consumption.

 The new Information Age also requires a much greater reliance on local fiscal and monetary pulses. China is the only EM that has already been practising a version of MMT while liberally mixing fiscal and monetary levers.

China has the right demographics for the New Age. China’s under 15-year-old cohort peaked in the late 1970s-early 1980s at around 370m. Today, it stands at 255m and is expected to drop to ~200m by 2040. Hence, China has benefited from a massive rise in the working age cohorts through 1980s-00s, but the labour force peaked in 2015 and should drop to ~890m by 2040.

Increasingly productivity is derived not from labour or tangible assets but from intangibles. Thereby, China has relatively less pressure to generate high number of good paying jobs.

China is the only major developing economy that is succeeding in building a broad range of intellectual and intangible assets. China is already responsible for 17% of global R&D spending. It is also employing more than 20% of global researchers and has become the leading publisher of cross-referenced scientific publications while its internationally recognized patterns now account for ~8% of the global pool vs nothing in 2000.

It is not surprising therefore that the new economy now accounts for more than 50% of MSCI China while these sectors are also responsible for the highest ROE’s and the greatest profit generation.

China still does face a myriad of challenges.

Most of China’s R&D as well as patents (over 60%) are mostly small incremental improvements rather than brand new breakthroughs. In other words, China is much better at innovation rather than inventiveness, and it continues to heavily depend on the bank of Western intellectual breakthroughs.

China lacks independent institutions and is heavily centralised, while developed countries are moving in the same direction, they are still much more independent. This clash between the Anglosphere and Sinosphere is still to play out yet and it is to be seen how China navigates through these complexities.   

As the world atrophies into sinocentric and other global value chains, the only feasible response is for China to create and effectively ring-fence its own sphere of influence while emphasizing the domestic economy.

China will need to invest even more aggressively in robotics and automation. Thus, one of the key challenges facing China is to redefine and strengthen its welfare and social policies while massively expanding its current modest basic income guarantee schemes.

China has the tool kit to manage this transition, as long as the geopolitical tensions are kept under a degree of control. Most importantly, it has monetary sovereignty and extensive experience of mixing fiscal and monetary policies, and indeed, for decades it has already practiced MMT. China also remains highly competitive across a range of industries, including many labour intensive and low value added segments, while it is growing an impressive Information Age footprint.

Thereby, the investable universe for Emerging markets had already shrunk to China, a bit of India and a few themes in Brazil. The other countries are cyclical proxies and even if the right corporates are invested in , many of these countries will suffer long term depreciation.

However, unless political and geopolitical tensions are contained, ESG and societal demands, might increasingly make China uninvestable for most investors.

As we move away from a world characterized by ‘freedom, choice and inefficiency’ towards ‘equality and fairness’, previously acceptable practices such as exuberant CEO compensation, excessive share buybacks, polluting the environment, engaging in uncontrolled surveillance or running labour camps will be heavily penalised.  It is therefore possible that an increasing number of China’s stocks and sectors might be ‘blacklisted’, not by the US State Department, but by ESG and societal norms, turning China into effectively an off-index market. While most investors argue that one cannot ignore the world’s second-largest market, we disagree. It can be ignored, and indeed, even China might eventually view it as the best ‘dual circulation’ outcome.

Banks and the Digital Dollar- Pivot Analytics

Paper money is going away in the very near future.  Sooner than you realize, paper money will be replaced by a “digital-USD”.  Money is already digital.  Your bank and brokerage accounts are book entries in a digital database.  These book entries are claims that can be exchanged for paper money or paper stock certificates.  Governments, including the US government, will be mandating the exchange of all paper money for its digital “upgrade.”  Why and when will this happen?  More importantly, what implications does it have for investing?

Regarding the when, its going to happen soon, very soon.  Within 7 or 10 years, paper money will be history and not legal tender anymore.  China is already testing a digital RMB, so our leading nation is well behind its competitor, and once China rolls out its digital RMB in 2023, our government will spearhead the rollout of our USD version.  In reality, China is already fully digital.  Nobody in China uses cash anymore, and credit cards are a very small piece of their market.  Chinese people use Alipay and other digital payment mechanisms on their phones.  Americans say “that can’t happen here, we value our privacy.”  That’s ridiculous.  If you buy with a debit or credit card, your grocery store knows when you buy broccoli and they know your brand of ice cream.  If you have a smartphone, your phone company knows where you are at all times, and, yes, they sell that location data to hundreds of companies who pay for it.   This location data is stripped of identifying records, rendering the data “blind” and “safe.”  Most people inherently understand this, but what they don’t know is that basic algorithms can then figure out exactly who you are even based on this blind data.  My friends at MIT get “blind” mobile phone data, merge it with other databases, and after they run it through algorithms, they know mostly everything about you, including your locations.   In 2020, if you used a smartphone and a credit card, “they” know everything about you.  In fact, most Americans choose to have very little privacy at all.  Google knows when you are at your girlfriend’s house, they know what gifts you buy her and most of your favorite topics.  This makes the digital dollar an easy sell for the government.  Try taking away free gmail, smartphones and credit cards and see the voters scream – people don’t want privacy. 

Later this decade, once the digital dollar is in place, the government can finally implement policy more effectively.  For example, right now, the main way that the government “prints money” is to buy bonds in the open market and hope that banks will lend the money.  The lent money is the increase in the money supply.  This system has contributed to the wealth gap, and it has also led to a lot of leverage in the system.  Furthermore, the Fed has tried to spur inflation with no luck.  Why?  The Fed really can’t make the banks lend under the current system.  The digital dollar can cure some of these issues because the government, if its smart, will retain the right to manufacture digital dollars, thus bypassing the banks.  The Feds are sick of trying to make the banks lend then regulating them because they are over-levered.  It’s a faulty system and it is likely to be replaced by digitally created money supply which can then be sent out to the people directly.  This will enable universal basic income (UBI) models to proliferate, and it will finally be easy enough for the government to make inflation go higher when they want. 

It will also wreak havoc on the underground economy, specifically drugs and tax evasion.  With the digital dollar, everything will be traced and tax evasion will drop substantially.  Giving the government more power over the money supply (disintermediating the banks) will eventually be very inflationary.  It could also be negative for the dollar exchange rate, but ultimately all governments will go this way so the FX rate implications are unclear at this juncture.  What is likely is that an aging workforce will get UBI payments in an inflation-first environment.  The government will try to inflate away the massive debt obligations, and they are likely to be successful.  In 10 or 15 years, we will see massive inflation on the order of the 1970s or even worse.  The Fed is on record saying they want inflation, and the politicians and public are addicted to the stimulus, so its print print print until we finally get sustained inflation.

How can one position themselves in this environment?  Think about purchasing multi-unit apartments with long-term fixed rate debt.  Getting a 25 year fixed rate mortgage in the year 2025 is going to be the safe way to short bonds in the inflationary environment.  Note that 2025 is a number of years away, and you will want to structure these purchases before the digital dollar is in place.   It doesn’t really look like we will get the runaway inflation now, so there are a few years prior to the inflationary spiral.

If you don’t want to own real estate, then consider buying medium-P/E equities.  In today’s market, the best stocks have the highest P/Es because they are the best companies and distant profits are discounted back at very low rates, making these high P/E stocks beneficiaries of the low rate environment.  When really-high inflation hits around 2030, these high P/Es are likely to be cut in half as interest rates spike upward.  You want to still pay up for some quality, but market-average valuations should suffice.  As always, stay away from the really “cheap” stocks unless you have done a ton of homework on each situation.

Finally, be wary of investing in traditional banking models.  Right now all bank stocks are very cheap on both earnings and tangible book values.  Banks are under siege from fintech solutions.  The fintechs are fee-based and are slowly disintermediating the banks turf.  Its safe and easy to have an online account, you don’t need a bank branch anymore.  Branches are quickly becoming an anachronistic cost-hurdle that disadvantage traditional banks vs. fintechs.  Even worse, fractional reserve banking is a terrible business model.  Imagine a 0.7% or 1% ROA, then you have to lever up 10x to get a reasonable ROE.  Of course, at 10x leverage, a 10% drop in collateral value mostly wipes you out.  The next round of inflation, late in the decade or in the early 2030s, will basically wipe out all the banks.  I predict the end of fractional reserve banking in its current form.  If the government retains the right to print and distribute digital dollars, banks in the fractional reserve system won’t be as necessary.   Its quite possible the next bank debacle will be significantly worse than 2008, so be wary of investing in banks later in the decade.  Right now, bank investors are waiting for higher interest rates, which could add to profitability.  Unfortunately, if rates really were to rise a significant amount, property values (collateral values) would fall, wiping out huge portions of bank equity – bank investors should be careful of what they wish for.  In my view, bank investing is difficult if rates stay low and also difficult if rates rise.  Keep time horizons shorter-to-medium term in any bank investments – don’t give the stocks more than a year to work.

Semiconductors Are the Closest Thing to Magic In the Modern World- Gavin Baker

The turmoil in technology stocks continues. Since early September, the Nasdaq 100 has corrected almost 13%. Heavyweights like Apple, Amazon and Facebook lost around 18%.

Gavin Baker knows how to keep a cool head in difficult situations like these. The founder of the US investment firm Atreides Management has been investing in technology companies for twenty years and ranks amongst the most renowned investors in the sector.

His core strengths include investments in semiconductor stocks like Nvidia, Intel or Micron Technology. «In the past, the semiconductor industry has gone through three negative demand shocks. Now, we have a positive demand shock in the form of artificial intelligence,» says Mr. Baker during an interview via Zoom from his company headquarters in Boston.

In this in-depth interview with The Market/NZZ, Mr. Baker explains what it takes to be a successful investor, why semiconductors become ever more important for the global economy and what the tech war between the US and China means for the industry. He also explains why he wouldn’t write off Intel despite recent production issues with its next-gen processors.

Mr. Baker, after the phenomenal run since the lows of March, technology stocks are experiencing some weakness. What’s your take on the current market environment as a veteran tech investor?

For the last forty years, technology has consistently been the most alpha-rich sector. This means there are always a lot of opportunities. Because of the pandemic, many technology companies were certainly accelerated this year. In many ways, Covid has pulled the world into the years between 2025 to 2030 which has resulted in some pretty spectacular moves for some stocks. But now, a lot of these stocks are at valuations that are historically quite extreme – and valuation actually always does matter. On the other hand, a lot of the big names that are driving the market are trading at less than 30x earnings. In the context of ten-year interest rates under 1% that’s not an aggressive multiple.

How can investors navigate today’s challenging environment?

To succeed as an investor, you have to be able to deal in paradoxes. You have to find the right balance between conviction and flexibility, between arrogance and humility: The arrogance to believe you can have a differentiated view on a stock in such a competitive market, and the humility to recognize that you could be wrong. As a technology investor in particular, you have to balance imagination with reality. You have to find the right balance between enthusiasm and dispassion. You also have to be very knowledgeable. What’s more, tech and consumer have kind of merged as a sector. For example, how can you look at Amazon and not study Walmart? How can you look at Airbnb and not be intimately familiar with Marriott and Hilton? All these businesses are merging in profound and important ways, and the lines between tech and consumer are blurring.

What does this mean for future investment returns in tech stocks?

It is a very interesting time in technology. Truth, valuation, interest rates and probability are gravitational forces for stocks. But trends in Free Cash Flow and Return on Invested Capital are quantum forces. One of the most fascinating things is that in the past, ROICs were highly mean reverting: Companies with high returns would generally see those returns mean revert over time. That stopped being true roughly fifteen years ago. Since then, high ROIC companies are maintaining those returns and they are showing no sign of falling.

How come?

I think it’s because of technology. Traditionally, we used to think about a natural monopoly of being a business with high fixed costs and extremely low variable costs. That’s why it makes sense to have only one cable, pipeline or railroad system because the costs of building these networks are so high. But today, a lot of these mega cap technology companies are natural monopolies of an entirely new kind the world has never seen – and that means they are much tougher to compete with.

Why are these companies a new kind of monopoly?

If you’re willing to spend enough capital, you can recreate the railroad systems in America with $500 billion. With a lot of money, you can also build a new cable system or a new electric or gas utility network. FedEx and UPS have shown us that you can recreate the postal system. But you actually cannot spend any amount of money and create a search engine that is better than the world’s dominant search engine today. People have tried: Amazon had an internal effort to build a search engine, and they concluded it was impossible. Microsoft has worked at Bing for many years and never really gained market share. The reason is that with any product where the quality is driven by artificial intelligence, it’s almost impossible to compete with the market leader.

What’s the reason for that?

To improve the quality of AI, you have to increase the amount of data you use to train the model. In essence, if you train an algorithm with 10x the data, the quality of the algorithm doubles. So you get these feedback loops: If you have a great product like a search engine, more people use it, you get more data, the product gets better, even more people use it and so forth. That fly wheel just spins and this is why it’s hard to replicate Google. It’s a game of cumulative knowledge and data. The primacy of data for AI quality means that some of these companies are truly unique because their competitive advantage is not just growing every year, it’s literally growing every second. Those are great dynamics for investors, but for society they create very difficult trade-offs: How do you regulate these monopolies? Do you regulate them in such a way that the product gets worse?

How does this impact a sector like semiconductors which propel artificial intelligence and the digital transformation of the world in general?

In the past, the semiconductor industry has gone through three negative demand shocks. Around eighteen years ago, the world’s most powerful computers were not utilized most of the time, meaning a lot of memory and microprocessor capacity was sitting idle. So the first negative shock was virtualization which helped to utilize servers much more efficiently. The next shock, at the beginning, was cloud computing because it increased the utilization of servers even further and decreased the importance of client devices like laptops. Strangely enough, the iPhone and smartphones in general were the third negative shock. That’s because they slowed down the growth of the PC market, and PCs are a lot more semiconductor intensive than smartphones in dollar terms. As semiconductors had to go through these three negative demand shocks, the whole industry, the whole supply chain, consolidated. As a result, you have one or two dominant companies in almost each area of semiconductors today.

So what’s next for the chip industry?

Now, we have a positive demand shock in the form of artificial intelligence. Sure, PCs have leveled out, smartphones are slowly additive, the electronic content of cars is growing and so is the internet of things. But AI, because data quantity is so important for quality, is much more semiconductor intensive. For me, a light bulb went off when I read this article in «Wired» about how Google’s engineers started to deploy voice recognition based on AI to Android smartphones. They realized that if each Android phone used Google’s voice search for just three minutes a day, Google would need to build twice as many data centers. What that means is that AI is so incredibly computation intensive that it led Google to develop its own chip called the Tensor Processing Unit or TPU. It’s kind of a graphics processor competitor and it saved Google from building a dozen new data centers.

How will AI translate into demand for semiconductors in general?

AI as a demand driver is just getting going. When humans write software, they understand that we want to limit the amount of computational resources. They write software in very elegant ways to minimize compute and memory. Artificial intelligence is none of that. AI is all about semiconductor brute force. Marc Andreessen wrote this famous op-ed article called «Why Software Is Eating The World». But if you were to rewrite it, you would say AI is eating the world. And, as AI eats the world, software not only becomes more important to every industry, but also more and more of that software is going to be created by artificial intelligence and not humans. That’s why one of my beliefs is that in fifty years, it will be illegal for humans to write software. It will be too important to be trusted to a human being. That means that naturally, the semiconductor intensity of global GDP will rise significantly as AI rises, and it’s happening against the backdrop of a very consolidated industry.

Exhibit A of this ongoing consolidation is Nvidia’s $40 billion Arm deal. What’s your interpretation of the largest semiconductor acquisition in history if approved?

Remarkably, Nvidia is basically paying the same price that SoftBank acquired Arm for four years ago, net of the earnout. The larger take away from this deal is the importance of software: Semiconductor companies themselves are writing a lot of software to enable AI algorithms to run on their chips. Specifically, in the data center you need to take a more holistic ecosystem approach. You’ve had that for Intel’s x86 architecture, but not with Arm. So one axis of the deal is creating a software ecosystem in the data center space for Arm. The other axis is embedding Nvidia’s graphics chips and Tensor cores IP with Arm and pushing that model out to the edge and to places where it makes sense for their chips.

In other words: This mega deal further cements Nvidia’s dominant status as the global leader for graphics processing units or GPUs?

The industry has certainly consolidated, but we will see what happens. Somebody once joked that Jensen Huang, the CEO of Nvidia, had single handedly brought back semiconductor venture capital because of the company’s success in the data center space. Most of the world’s deep learning runs on GPUs, and most of these GPUs are made by Nvidia. But over the last five years, billions of dollars have gone into semiconductor venture capital. In contrast to that, there was almost no venture activity in semiconductors until deep learning really took off. So at the same time as the industry has consolidated, you have a lot of new venture funded, innovative competitors like Cerebras or Mythic coming for different corners of the semiconductor industry and for Nvidia in particular.

Semiconductor stocks like Nvidia have yielded astonishing returns over the last decade. How hard is it to find attractive investment opportunities in the chip sector at these valuations?

There is a lot of dispersion. Nvidia is an expensive stock today, but other areas of the semiconductor industry are quite cheap. GPUs are very important for artificial intelligence, but so is memory. In fact, AI uses six times more memory computing power than software written by human beings. So memory chips are an interesting subsector of semiconductors today, and it’s heavily consolidated. It is a cyclical industry, and it’s slowly becoming less cyclical.

And what about analog chips? With the merger between Analog Devices and Maxim Integrated we’re seeing attempts for further consolidation in this subsector as well.

The analog space is really attractive. It’s an incredible long-term compounder, and the industry is already very consolidated. A lot of people used to make the mistake of thinking that we wouldn’t need analog chips in a digital world. That is not true at all because the world is analog, and taking analog information – light, sound and power – and helping to translate those signals into digital streams of 1s and 0s and manage them is super important. I often say semiconductors are the closest thing to magic in the modern world. Analog is like the black magic because there are only a small number of people in the world today who can design these analog chips. It’s trial and error, it takes a very long time, and it’s almost as much of an art as it is a science.

When it comes to developing leading-edge chips, semiconductor companies have to take bold and costly bets. How do you cope with these risks as an investor?

You watch them very carefully. It’s incredible what’s going on: Another part of magic are these leading-edge process nodes where Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing, Intel, Nvidia, Xilinx, Samsung and Micron are playing. It’s almost like they are developing recipes: Mainly, they are all using the same machines from Lam Research and ASML, and they are putting them together in slightly different ways, using slightly different materials on each layer, or they have slightly different transistors. So they are making these huge ten, twenty billion dollar bets on the right recipe. That’s because you have a big advantage if you get to a node first since you can optimize that node and learn and then apply those learnings for getting to the next node first.

Those giant bets can also go wrong as we just witnessed in the case of Intel.

Intel guessed correctly for the last forty years, and then they guessed wrongly. They probably inserted extreme ultraviolet lithography too late. That resulted in them losing process leadership to Taiwan Semi. This is one of the highest stakes games being played in the world today: In the logic space between Taiwan Semi, Intel and to some extent Samsung. Even in the processor design space Intel, AMD and Nvidia are making giant two, three, four billion-dollar bets on designing a processor, making it work on a manufacturing process. They have to continuously guess right.

For the first time ever, Intel has lost its technological leadership to Taiwan Semi. Is this the end of an era in the semiconductor industry?

The media loves narratives, big turning points and headlines like “The End of an Era”. It’s certainly possible, but Intel is a great and proud company. They have a lot of brilliant engineers, and they are one of the most important national assets for the United States. Today, the leading-edge semiconductor fabrication plants are in America, there are two Intel fabs in Israel, and then there are fabs in South Korea and Taiwan – that’s it! So as an American, I hope that’s not the end of an era for Intel. I would not be as quick to count them out, but for sure they have their work cut out for them. They were always ahead, and now they are behind. That’s a position that is new to them.

Against that backdrop: What are the implications of the rising tensions between the US and China for semiconductor investors?

If Intel falls further behind and leading-edge semiconductor manufacturing becomes concentrated in Taiwan then Taiwan will become geopolitically important in a way that the Middle East never was. Modern semiconductor manufacturing is at least as important to the economy as oil was in the 1970s. But in the case of oil, at least it was available all over the world albeit at higher prices than in the Middle East. Imagine a world where oil only came from one country, and how important that country would have been for the last hundred years. That is what the world would look like if Intel cannot find its footing and continue to manufacture chips at the leading-edge here in America. Taiwan could become by far the most geopolitically important country in the history of the world.

In accordance with the latest US sanctions, most chip suppliers have suspended dealings with China’s tech giant Huawei. How much of a concern is the tech war when it comes to investments in technology?

It does feel like the US and China are beginning to de-couple somewhat. A lot of companies have been moving manufacturing out of China. But outside of some of the obvious impacts, there is not much to say beyond this: If Huawei isn’t able to sell base stations and phones in much of the world because of US policy and if Huawei is unable to acquire the parts and components it needs to make phones even in China, then there are going to be a lot of winners and losers. But in general, I would just say that the current US industrial policy is very strange.

What do you mean by that?

Essentially, the US is saying to China: We are not going to sell you these semiconductors, but we are going to sell you all the equipment you need to make your own semiconductors. This means that in several years it may be irrelevant. In some ways, the entire global economy rests on a couple of relatively small American, Japanese and European semiconductor capital equipment manufacturers; whether it’s Lam Research, KLA-Tencor, ASML or Tokyo Electron or a couple of American electronic design automation companies with Cadence and Synopsys. Without those companies, you cannot build a semiconductor. In a metaphorical sense, it’s almost like current industrial US policy is saying to China: Airplanes are important. We are not going to sell you airplanes anymore, but we are going to teach you how to make your own airplanes. It’s very strange. If our goal is to limit China’s access to these advanced technologies, the US is doing the exact opposite of what would be logical.

What are you doing differently?

A lot of capital allocators like to ask me about the concept of edge. To me, an edge means a repeatable process that drives alpha. But I don’t believe in edge. I think it’s a fairy tale. The world is too competitive. Going back to AI, investing is where chess was in 1996, when there was an enormous race between human grandmasters and algorithms, and Deep Blue started to beat Garry Kasparov by using brute compute force. Today, that’s why value strategies have stopped working: Value investors used to have an edge. They were very quantitative. Maybe, they had a strong stomach and were willing to buy companies because they were cheap no matter how bad it sounded. But the problem is that anything that can be put in a spreadsheet will no longer generate alpha because it has been arbitraged away by quant investors. There is so much quantitative money chasing those same metrics.

So how do you try to generate alpha for your clients?

To me, all alpha comes from insights. An insight is kind of a differentiated long-term viewpoint about a stock. It’s a differentiated view about the long-term state of the world. Often, these insights are very simple, and a lot of them are right brain: imaginative, being slightly better in seeing the future states of the world. These insights need to be grounded and tested in reality regularly. Also, it pays to boil them down to just a few variables. Like Occam’s razor, the injunction not to make more assumptions than you absolutely need, simple is beautiful when it comes to investing. With electric vehicles for instance, all that matters is efficiency: battery capacity and range to get miles per kWh. You want to focus on the variables that are important instead of the variables that are interesting. So what I spent the most time on is focusing on competitive advantage, because in tech competitive advantage is never static. If you’re not growing your competitive advantage in technology, it is probably shrinking.

https://themarket.ch/interview/semiconductors-are-the-closest-thing-to-magic-in-the-modern-world-ld.2719