David Hunter: Gold and Silver Miners to be the Next Dot Com Bubble

I have been reading David’s view for last two years and he predicted 3000 on S&p,10 on crude oil , 1800 on Gold and massive rally in miners in 2018 .He also predicted 0.5% on US 10 year more than a year back.

Below are his latest views

Tom welcomes back experienced investment professional David Hunter of Contrarian Macro Advisors to the show. David shares some of his controversial contrarian views on where the markets are heading. He often receives criticism from investors for his differing views.

David expects a rebound this summer and fall followed by another pull-back in the market. The market should rally for a few more years due to massive money printing by the Fed and central banks.

His long term views hold for vastly higher gold, silver and oil prices as inflation takes hold in a few years. This inflation will result in an eventual global deflationary bust, which will come with the biggest bear market since 1929.

Time Stamp References:
1:10 – Recent events review.
4:15 – Melt-up explanation.
6:20 – Outlook for Markets.
10:30 – Economic Lag Time.
13:50 – Second collapse predictions.
17:00 – Eventual global deflationary bust.
21:30 – What will drive the current recovery.
23:47 – Expectations for the US dollar.
26:30 – Service debts at zero percent interest.
28:15 – Money printing and the Fed.
34:40 – Bullish case for gold, silver, mining stocks.
39:45 – Timeline for his predictions.
44:25 – Bond market thoughts.

Talking Points From This Episode
• He expected a correction but not this extreme.
• Expects a melt-up rebound in stocks and then a pullback.
• This downturn and recession are likely to last 18 months.
• Expecting a manufacturing-driven recovery, not a consumer.
• Global deflationary bust coming by the end of the decade.

David is Chief Macro Strategist with Contrarian Macro Advisors. He is an investment professional with 25 years of investment management experience and 18 years as a sell-side strategist with strong expertise in macroeconomic analysis and portfolio management. His strong macro capabilities, combined with a contrarian philosophy, have allowed him to forecast economic cycles and spot market trends well ahead of the consensus. Intellectually honest, independent thinker comfortable with charting a course apart from the crowd. Accomplished stock picker and value-oriented portfolio manager.

Devil’s Advocate- The Bull Case

by Daniel McMurtrie via themedium.com

I have been spending a lot of time trying to observe not just what is going on in the world, but also what’s going on in my own head. I’ve realized that I may have a blind spot right now. Most of the people I know in my hometown of Richmond, VA work in the industries which have been hit hardest by the virus — restaurants, bars, hospitality, healthcare. Speaking to people I care about, it has felt like doomsday. I’ve felt unable to be optimistic given their pain and knowing how so many others are dealing with the same or worse. It has felt that things are so bad and the ways in which they could get worse for a very extended period are numerous. But my job is to invest in the stock market, and the stock market appears to many to have completely diverged from the “real economy.”

So… why could that be? What’s the bull case here for stocks? Let’s set aside long term existential concerns for a moment and look at what things could look like to a bull in the next 4–8 months.

The virus and its impacts are increasingly socially normalized and tolerable for Americans after 2 months stuck inside. A re-shutdown appears unlikely unless there is a radical increase in lethality / risk from the virus. If deaths are steady, the cumulative death toll that is socially allowable may be quite high (>500K over 18 months).

Monetary policy has collapsed discount rates globally, with risks more to deflation than inflation. The Fed has made it clear a liquidity crisis will not be allowed.

Fiscal stimulus has made consumers more than whole, with aggregate consumer purchasing power now UP versus pre COVID. Short term, the market is presuming additional significant fiscal stimulus. If it does not come, the market will try to force it. This is a major risk + downside trigger, but it requires you to presume the Democrats or Ron Paul type Republics will have both the will and the ability to gamble the economy for election plays.

If a combination of Monetary Policy and Fiscal Stimulus can / did fix this crisis practically overnight, equity discount rates will lower / multiples will increase as the probability of systemic failures is lower. Failure is being made impossible so long as a firm does not fail alone. Long term, the market will now know it can force any of these measures and more from the government. This is very bullish equity beta generally. At a high level, the sovereign and the system is so levered that it cannot allow material downside, so they are putting on a martingale betting strategy and assuming all risk on the USD. This could fail at some point, but it’s a much bigger issue than equity prices.

If the consumer is strong and tolerance for virus risk is increasing, the prospects for SMEs re-opening are better than our base case. While it will not be overnight, consistently improving business performance will have a reflexive impacts on increasing business confidence.

Capital markets remain extremely accommodating with debt and equity financing available for nearly everyone who seeks it. Covenants, loan payments, and rents are being adjusted as needed almost universally. Everyone is playing ball.

I think I speak for a lot of people when I say I was blown away by earnings this quarter. The large index weightings are virtually unaffected in ways the market will care about, and most of the companies we cover have reported robust recoveries in weekly data in April. Even existing home sales are sitting over 90% of normal with people not being able to go out and look at houses. Pretty wild to me.

Georgia’s reopening data is really robust, having based and now uniformly moving up in all categories steadily.

Mark Cuban did some surveying on reopening weekend. The data was not very positive, but the signal in this data will be how it changed over time. It should not be surprising that most business operators did not have the risk tolerance to burn cash to be open during the first few days they were allowed to.

Specific individual companies and assets may require a repricing, but there is more than enough liquidity for those assets to not become stranded. Isolated firm failures are not terribly economically relevant if the underlying economic output is not impaired. Candidly, there is an absurd amount of money looking to buy distressed individual situations.

Within the stock market, retail investors are participating in recent upside more than any other investor group. This is bullish for overall business and consumer confidence. While it is true that retail inflow spikes tend to end badly, they also have been historically predictive of extreme bull market runs.

Investors as a whole remain extremely bearish, to the extent that even entertaining a bullish view induces fairly violent responses. But these people are already out of the market. Their views do not impact price unless they are forced to capitulate, in which case they drive the market up.

News flow is consistently incrementally positive and forms a reflexive loop where negative news is looked through and the bears and bearish views become thought of as annoying “boy who cried wolf” claims.

At a high level, all of this feels so, so, so wrong. It feels that it should not be this way. The economy should not be simply a function of immense government money, right? Or has it always been that way and we are bound by the comforts of having invested in the United States? But it is now, and the cognitive dissonance here combined with the immense amount of financial liquidity equates to the perfect setup for a massive bull move / equity bubble until such a time there exists a feedback loop to stop these dynamics.

I’m not yet at a point where I have positioned my book based on the above, but I am thinking about it. My hope is that among the hundreds of people who post nasty things about me after reading this, a few may have some interesting insights.

For now, I think the bear case is dead until either momentum breaks and/or information above changes. The biggest potential catalyst for bears in my mind is congress refusing to do additional fiscal stimulus. Having said all of this, the top is now likely in, as I have become my own contra and in doing so I offer myself to be nailed to the cross as the messiah of the bears.

There will be massive debt write off.

As Central Bank Balance sheets rise to newer highs, and uncertainty surrounding the extent and time period to which the economy comes back online creating third order effects, we need to understand what comes next.

If we were to consider the proposition that history repeats itself or rhymes in certain ways, a few insights can be garnered.

For instance, we are able to garner that the ability of debt to generate GDP growth seems to be severely diminishing.

If history is a guide, stocks have further to go before they hit bottom. That’s Sokoloff’s view -Then as now, he says, “central bankers were pushing on a string”, trying in vain to whip up a real economic recovery with monetary policy.

“The more debt you add [via monetary and even some fiscal policy], the more unproductive the debt becomes,” says Sokoloff.

This fits in with the view that we are in a defining period of financial history as we were in the 1920’s. As the dollar is inflated away and purchasing power eroded, we will see that because it coincides with flight to safety towards dollar , the effect on dollar will observed with a certain lag.

“When you get debt above 90 per cent [of GDP], you reduce economic growth by one-third. And the velocity of money declines,” says Sokoloff. “So, the productivity in that debt declines too. A dollar of debt used to get you 40 cents of growth. Now, with all this stimulus, it’s about 25 per cent.”

One of the highlights of Sokoloff’s report is the list of timely historical quotes, such as this one from Montagu Norman, governor of the Bank of England between 1920 and 1944, which ran in an issue last year analysing whether the Fed rate cut of 1921 might have fuelled the boom-bust cycle of the Roaring Twenties: “We achieved absolutely nothing . . . nothing that I did, and very little that old Ben [Strong, head of the NY Fed] did, internationally produced any good effect — or indeed any effect at all except that we collected money from a lot of poor devils and gave it over to the four winds.”

As we see MMT rise to the foray where the limit to deficit financing is inflation rather than taxes, funding or any other fixed point. We will see the value of currency being eroded further which bodes positive for gold , as it captures the corresponding loss in purchasing power.

So are we heading for a default by loss of purchasing power of the currency in which it is denominated , Sokoloff concurs. As he states in fact, even with the stimulus, “there will have to be massive debt relief on both principal and interest”. Not that this is anything new; Sokoloff has been making comparisons between a previous debt-forgiving superpower — Rome — and the US for years.

https://www.ft.com/content/b8639ab6-8936-11ea-9dcb-fe6871f4145a

Going Nuclear- Doug Noland

In a CBB from a decade or so ago, I noted that at the commencement of WWII President Roosevelt marshaled an agreement from the major warring parties to avoid the bombing of civilian targets. It was not long, however, before civilians living near military installations were considered unfortunate collateral damage. And so began the incremental abandonment of the principle of safeguarding innocent noncombatants. By the end of the war, there were no limits – nothing too outrageous or deplorable: population centers, viewed strategically as even more valuable than military targets, were under unrelenting brutal bombardment. Hiroshima and Nagasaki suffered nuclear devastation.

“Money printing” and fiscal borrowing/spending viewed as unconscionable prior to 2008 are these days easily justified. The “nuclear option” is readily accepted as a mainstream policy response. A Wall Street economist appearing on Bloomberg even posited the current crisis is worse than World War II.

To challenge monetary and fiscal stimulus is almost tantamount to being unAmerican. After all, tens of millions of American citizens are hurting – millions of small businesses near the breaking point. They are deserving of support in these circumstances. Yet I don’t want to lose focus on analyzing and chronicling ongoing catastrophic policy failure. COVID-19 greatly muddies the analytical waters.

Federal Reserve Credit jumped another $146bn last week to $6.598 TN, pushing the eight-week gain to a staggering $2.453 TN. M2 “money supply” rose $365bn, with an eight-week rise of $1.727 TN. Institutional Money Fund Assets (not included in M2) rose another $76bn, boosting the eight-week expansion to $921bn.

The Fed this week expanded its new “main street” lending facility, raising limits to include companies with up to 15,000 employees and $5.0 billion in revenues. Our central bank, as well, broadened terms for its state and local government financing vehicle to include counties as small as 500,000 (down from 2 million) and cities of 250,000 (reduced from 1 million).

From the WSJ (Nick Timiraos and Jon Hilsenrath): “The Federal Reserve is redefining central banking. By lending widely to businesses, states and cities in its effort to insulate the U.S. economy from the coronavirus pandemic, it is breaking century-old taboos about who gets money from the central bank in a crisis, on what terms, and what risks it will take about getting that money back.” The article quoted Chairman Powell: “None of us has the luxury of choosing our challenges; fate and history provide them for us. Our job is to meet the tests we are presented.”

There has traditionally been an unwritten agreement – an understanding borne from historical hardship – that central banks would never resort to flagrant monetary inflation. Risk to “innocent civilians” would be much too great. “Open letters” challenged the Fed’s foray into QE, including one from 2010 signed by a group of leading economists: “We believe the Federal Reserve’s large-scale asset purchase plan (so-called ‘quantitative easing’) should be reconsidered and discontinued. We do not believe such a plan is necessary or advisable under current circumstances. The planned asset purchases risk currency debasement and inflation, and we do not think they will achieve the Fed’s objective of promoting employment.”

QE was to be a temporary crisis-management tool, employed to respond to the “worst financial crisis since the Great Depression.” The initial Trillion from late-2008 was to be reversed, returning the Fed’s balance sheet back near the pre-crisis $1.0 Trillion level. Somehow, QE was employed in 2019, with stocks at record highs and unemployment at 60-year lows. Last year’s monetary fiasco foreshadowed the 2020 nuclear option – a couple Trillion in a couple months. At this point, it’s gone so far beyond anything thought possible with “helicopter money” or even MMT stimulus. Don’t hold your breath awaiting “open letters” of protest. A Fed balance sheet briskly on its way to $10 TN seems just fine to most.

The Fed cut rates to zero (0-0.25%) in December 2008. The Fed then waited a full seven years for a single little “baby step” 25 bps increase. Nine years from the slashing to zero, rates were still only 1.25% (to 1.5%), before peaking at a paltry 2.25% (to 2.50%) with the Powell Fed’s final 25 bps increase in December 2018. Going into the 2008 crisis at less than $900 billion, the Fed’s balance sheet was still at $3.7 TN as of August 2019 (down from peak $4.5TN).

The Fed’s failure to retreat from aggressive monetary stimulus (aka “removing the punch bowl”) was a critical policy blunder that promoted destructive financial and economic excess. And in an unamusing Groundhogs Day dynamic, we are to believe that the current crisis will be resolved by only more egregious volumes of Fed liquidity and “loose money”. As master of the obvious, I will state categorically: “It’s not going to work.”

A question from Bloomberg’s Steve Matthews during Chairman Powell’s post-meeting press conference: “Do you worry that this recession is going to fall hardest on those workers who’ve struggled and just got job gains in the last year or two, and that it may take years from now before there are opportunities for them again?”

Powell: “…We were in a place, only two months ago, we were well into, beginning the second half of the 11th year is where we were. And every reason to think that it was ongoing. We were hearing from minority, low and moderate income in minority communities that this was the best labor market they’d seen in their lifetime. All the data supported that as well. And it is heartbreaking, frankly, to see that all threatened now. All the more need for our urgent response and, also, that of Congress, which has been urgent and large, and to do what we can to avoid longer run damage to the economy which is what I mentioned earlier. This is an exogenous event that, you know, it happened to us. It wasn’t because there was something wrong with the economy. And I think it is important that we do everything we can to avoid that longer-run damage and try to get back to where we were because I do very much have that concern.”

My comment: I understand the Fed’s attention to “community outreach” and its PR focus on minorities and low-income workers. Yet not even Trillions of lip service will change the reality that the Fed’s securities market policy focus promotes inequality and divisiveness. At its roots, QE is a mechanism of wealth redistribution. Zero rates transfer wealth from savers to borrowers and speculators.

Moreover, there are myriad costs associated with central banks nullifying the business cycle. The toll the unfolding crisis will inflict upon minority and low-income families will be horrendous. Federal Reserve policies of unrelenting monetary stimulus and market intervention ensure an especially problematic downturn. The business cycle is absolutely essential to the functioning of capitalistic systems. Policymaker intolerance for even mild market and economic corrections promotes cumulative excess and distortions that will culminate in extraordinarily deep and painful busts. I viewed chair Yellen’s employment focus as convenient justification and rationalization for delays to the start of policy “normalization.” Boom and bust dynamics do no favors for minorities and the working class. Monetary and financial stability should have been the Fed’s top priority. QE, low rates and market backstops reinforce instability and latent fragility.

The Associated Press’s Chris Rugaber: “You did talk about potential loss of skills over time. So, are you worried about structural changes in job markets that would keep unemployment high and, therefore, potentially beyond the ability of the Fed to do anything about, which was something that was debated, as you know, after the last recession?”

Powell: “So, in terms of the labor market, the risk of damage to people’s skills and their careers and their lives is a function of time to some extent. So, the longer one is unemployed, the harder it gets, I think, and we’ve probably all seen this in our lives, the harder it is to get back into the workforce and get back to where you were, if you ever do get back to where you were. So… longer and deeper downturns have had, have left more of a mark, generally, in that dimension with the labor force. And so, that’s why, as I mentioned, that’s why the urgency in doing what we can to prevent that longer-run damage.”

My comment: Central banks have for way too long encouraged the notion of deflation as the principal risk. I have argued Bubbles were instead the overarching systemic risk. Central bankers (along with Wall Street) have asserted that aggressive monetary stimulus has been necessary to counter deflationary risks. But if Bubbles were indeed the prevailing risk, this added stimulus would undoubtedly promote only greater maladjustment, systemic risk and fragility. After already contributing to inequality and divisiveness, monetary policymaking now places trust in the institution of the Federal Reserve in jeopardy. Flawed doctrine and a string of recurring missteps have ensured the worst of possible outcomes: a deep and prolonged downturn within a backdrop of heightened social and political instability.

Politico’s Victoria Guida: “…More broadly, you mentioned earlier this year that the federal debt was on an unsustainable path. And I was just wondering, for Republicans that are starting to get worried about how much fiscal spending they’re having to do in this crisis, you know, whether that should be a concern for them?

Powell: “In terms of fiscal concern…, for many years, I’ve been, before the Fed, I have long time been an advocate for the need for the United States to return to a sustainable path from a fiscal perspective at the federal level. We have not been on such a path for some time which just means that the debt is growing faster than the economy. This is not the time to act on those concerns. This is the time to use the great fiscal power of the United States to do what we can to support the economy and try to get through this with as little damage to the longer run productive capacity of the economy as possible. The time will come, again, and reasonably soon, I think, where we can think about a long-term way to get our fiscal house in order. And we absolutely need to do that. But this is not the time to be, in my personal view, this is not the time to let that concern, which is a very serious concern, but to let that get in the way of us winning this battle…”

My comment: We’re in the endgame. There will be no turning back on either massive monetary or fiscal stimulus. Not surprisingly, Congress is already contemplating an additional Trillion dollars of spending. The floodgates have been flung wide-open, and at this point it will prove troublesome to ration stimulus. Meanwhile, deeply maladjusted market and economic structure will dictate unrelenting stimulus measures.

I would add that last year’s reckless Trillion dollar federal deficit was the upshot of years of experimental monetary policy. There was but one mechanism with the power to inhibit Washington profligacy: market discipline (i.e. higher Treasury yields). But market discipline was one of the great sacrifices to the Gods of QE and New Age monetary management. Stating that the Fed has been complicit in Washington running massive deficits (even throughout a market and economic boom period) is not strong enough.

Bloomberg’s Michael McKee: “And I know you said that this isn’t the time to worry about moral hazard, but do you worry, with the size of stimulus that you and the Congress are putting into the economy, there could be financial stability problems if this goes along?”

Powell: “In terms of the markets…, our concern is that they be working. We’re not focused on the level of asset prices in particular, it’s just markets are trying to price in something that is so uncertain as to be unknowable which is the path of this virus globally and its effect on the economy. And that’s very, very hard to do. That’s why you see volatility the way it’s been, market reacting to things with a lot of volatility. But… what we’re trying to assure really, is that the market is working. The market is assessing risks, lenders are lending, borrowers are borrowing, asset prices are moving in response to events. That is really important for everybody, including… the most vulnerable among us because, if markets stop working and credit stops flowing, then you see, that’s when you see… very sharp negative, even more negative economic outcomes. So, I think our measures have supported market function pretty well. We’re going to stay very careful, carefully monitoring that. But I think it’s been good to see markets working again, particularly the flow of credit in the economy has been a positive thing as businesses have been able to build up their liquidity buffers.”

My comment: It is the nature of contemporary Bubble markets that they are only “working” when they’re inflating. We witnessed again in March how quickly selling turns disorderly – how abruptly markets turn illiquid and dislocate. There were, after all, only nine trading sessions between February 19th all-time market highs and the Fed’s March 3rd emergency rate cut.

The Fed has for years nurtured the perception that the Federal Reserve was ready to backstop the markets in the event of incipient instability. The Fed “put” became deeply embedded in the pricing of various asset markets – certainly including stocks, corporate Credit, Treasuries, structured finance and derivatives. But this financial structure turns unsupportable the moment markets begin questioning the capacity of central banks to sustain inflated prices.

We observed the Fed being “trapped” dynamic in action: Market Bubbles had inflated to unparalleled extremes. When collapse began in earnest, unprecedented liquidity injections and interventions were required to reverse the panic. But this liquidity was then available to fuel disorderly markets on the upside, setting the stage for only more instability going forward. Fed officials are surely delighted their measures are proving instrumental in what will be record debt sales (Treasuries and corporates). But do today’s market yields make any sense heading into a major economic downturn with unprecedented debt and deficits? The Fed can claim it doesn’t focus on the level of asset prices, but the reality is the Fed is trapped in policies meant to sustain highly elevated asset markets.

Listening to Bloomberg Television Wednesday ahead of the Fed’s policy statement, I sat in disbelief at what I was hearing: one of our nation’s leading economists speaking utter nonsense. There is a long list of individuals that should have some explaining to do when this all blows up.

Bloomberg’s Tom Keene: “In the field of economics, there are people that are always excellent at mathematics and then there’s the truly excellent. I spoke with Randall Kroszner of Chicago and the Booth School earlier today – he’s one of those people. And another one is Narayana Kocherlakota, of course, the President of the Minneapolis Fed and now at the University of Rochester. He has been extremely aggressive about a Fed that needs a different and better dynamic… You have said that this Fed must be more aggressive. What is the next step for Chairman Powell?”

Kocherlakota: “I think that the Fed should really contemplate going negative with interest rates. I think that would send a powerful message about their willingness to be supportive of their price stability and employment mandates. Obviously, there’s a limited amount of room that you can go negative, because eventually banks and others will substitute into cash. But I think there is some room to go negative – 25, 50 bps below zero – and that makes all your other tools more effective – the forward guidance we’re going to see at some point down the road, asset purchases and yield curve control – all that becomes more effective if you can go further below zero.”

Bloomberg’s Scarlet Fu: “We’ve seen Europe, we’ve seen Japan go further below zero and it really hasn’t done what they wanted. In Japan’s case, the country then moved to yield curve control. We know the Federal Reserve has telegraphed yield curve control as an option, what’s the risk from the Fed just moving to targeting yields now and skipping over going to negative interest rates?”

Kocherlakota: “The risk, Scarlet, is you’re not doing enough. I think the Fed statement is exactly right. The ongoing public health crisis will weigh heavily on economic activity in the near-term – and poses considerable risk to the outlook over the medium-term… You want to throw every tool you got available at that. I’m not saying I’m opposed to yield curve control – I’m absolutely not. But I think going negative with interest rates is going to make that tool even more powerful – more effective than simply rolling it out on its own.”

Keene: “One of the great themes here… and this goes to the late Marvin Goodfriend of Carnegie Mellon, is the amount of negative interest rates. Ken Rogoff at Harvard also addressed it in his glorious book, ‘The Curse of Cash’. OK, so we tweak it a quarter point, a little bit here, a little bit here. Really, do we need to experiment with a boldness that forces the banking system into new actions?”

Kocherlakota: “One of the roles of economists like myself that are in academia, you mentioned Ken and Marvin who lead the way on this, is to really try to push us into a much better place. I really believe that fifty years from now people are going to look back – economists are going to look back – as the existence of cash much like we look back at the gold standard. We look back at the gold standard as a period which really hamstrung monetary policy and created huge amounts of unemployment as a result during the Great Depression. People are going to look back at the existence of cash and the zero lower bound – the inability to go much below zero with interest rates – in the same way, hamstringing the ability of central banks to provide sufficient support to the economy – and thereby creating excessive unemployment and robbing people of their jobs.”

Fu: “…You were out front in suggesting that the Federal Reserve cut interest rates before they actually did between meetings, I just wonder with this idea of negative interest rates are you in communication with anyone on the FOMC? Is there any slice of the members of the FOMC open to the idea of negative interest rates in any meaningful proportion?”

Kocherlakota: “I’m certainly not in communication with the FOMC, except hopefully they’re watching right now. What I learned during my time as a policymaker is that – I was a hawk for a while and then I became a dove. But I could never be dovish enough. There’s always this force within you as an economist that’s pushing you toward being a hawk – to be concerned about inflation or concerns about putting too much accommodation out there – too much monetary policy out there. What I learned at my time at the Fed was never to be concerned about that. So right now, I think the Fed is concerned about going negative. They feel that somehow that’s going to cause risk to the banking system or somehow be too much in terms of monetary policy. My own view is, and I hope I’m wrong on this, but I think they’ll learn as we have a slow recovery from where we are that they’ll have to do more. I think negative will come up… Down the road I think it will come up because I think they’ll need it.”

“The Fed must be more aggressive”? You gotta be kidding. And why such an ardent proponent of negative rates when there is little if any evidence from Europe or Japan that they are constructive? The “existence of cash” and the “zero lower bound” are the problems – similar to the gold standard? All nonsense. Our nation desperately needs some talented young, independent-minded economists to take the initiative to reform our deeply flawed economic doctrine. This week’s CBB was too heavy on quotes and light on analysis. But there was just a lot that needed to be documented.

http://creditbubblebulletin.blogspot.com/

Occam’s Razor on Interest Rates and the Stock Market

Posted April 28, 2020 by Ben Carlson

The peak of the stock market before the 1987 Black Monday crash came in August even though the pummeling itself didn’t occur until October.

When the S&P 500 peaked that August the 10 year treasury yielded 8.8%. By the time October rolled around the benchmark U.S. government bond was yielding 10.2%.

Can you imagine earning more than 10% on a “riskless” government bond today?!

Prior to falling more than 36% from 1968-1970, the 10 year yielded close to 6%.

Before the S&P 500 was cut in half in 1973-1974, government debt yielded 6.5%.

In the nasty recession that began in 1980, which saw the S&P 500 fall close to 30% by 1982, you could have gotten nearly 13% for simply buying a 10 year treasury bond.

Stocks fell roughly 20% in 1990. Heading into that bear market bonds paid almost 9%.

Bond investors could have lent to the government at more than 6% when the dot-com bubble blew up in early-2000.

Even before the Great Financial Crisis in October 2007, high-quality bonds were fetching almost 5%.

When the stock market peaked in late-February earlier this year the 10-year was paying less than 1.6%.

U.S. stocks have never gone into a crash with lower rates than we had this year. And, as with most bear markets, the flight to safety has pushed those yields even lower (currently less than 0.7%).

To get a better sense of the difference between market crashes over the past 50+ years and the current iteration, here’s a comparison of the rates at prior peaks along with the annual income being paid out on a $100,000 investment for 10-year treasuries:

I’m stating the obvious here but maybe people are overcomplicating things when it comes to looking for reasons the market has been so resilient during this crisis. What if interest rates are the Occam’s razor here?

I’ve looked at all of the other reasons the stock market has held up better than expected during a massive economic contraction:

These factors are likely all playing a role but the fact that bond yields are so low may be the simplest of all explanations as to why the stock market hasn’t fallen further.1

All of the world’s investable assets have to go somewhere. Every portfolio in the world is made up of some combination of stocks, bonds, cash and other assets.

Investors can always go to cash and the numbers show there was a record surge in money market inflows last month. But think about all of the money invested by pensions, endowments, foundations, sovereign wealth funds, family offices, highly paid corporate executives and wealthy individuals. Do you think all of those investors are going to sell their risk assets to move into government bonds or cash that’s yielding nothing?

Just look at the paltry income provided by 10 year treasuries on $1 million now versus the starting point of every decade since 1960 and where we stand today:

In the past, you could legitimately move to the beach and live off the interest of default-free government bonds.

I don’t know too many people who can live on 65 basis points of income a year.

There are many reasons interest rates are so low right now other than the flight to quality. Demographics, the Fed, low inflation, a huge number of retiring baby boomers, negative rates in other countries, lower economic growth from a maturing economy and a host of other issues help explain why rates have been falling for 4 decades and are fast approaching 0% (or lower).

Does this mean stocks can’t or won’t go lower?

Of course not. The market fell nearly 35% in the blink of an eye at the outset of this crisis. I’m not suggesting low interest rates can prop up the stock market forever or completely abolish volatility.

In fact, just the opposite. I think interest rates on the floor will invite even more volatility into the fray, both to the upside and the downside. We could see many more booms and busts because of the interest rate environment, they just might be smaller in magnitude than they were in the past.

Low rates will also likely lead to a market that doesn’t always make sense.

Valuations aren’t always going to make sense in this environment.

The stock market’s ups and downs aren’t always going to make sense in this environment.

Investor actions aren’t always going to make sense in this environment.

Risk appetites aren’t always going to be aligned with portfolio allocations in this environment.

The fact that investors no longer have a safe haven where they can earn decent rates of interest will have many unintended consequences.

I’m not the first person to discuss a possible TINA (there is no alternative) marketplace. But I think people underestimate how a dearth of yield in high-quality bonds has changed the incentives and risk equation for numerous investors.

We have never seen interest rates this low. Don’t be surprised if this leads to more surprising outcomes because investors have never navigated markets like this before.

https://awealthofcommonsense.com/2020/04/occams-razor-on-interest-rates-and-the-stock-market/

Party At The Golden Moon Tower

by JC Parets

In current markets, there was a huge party that got busted in February. But not to worry. There is a new fiesta in the making as we speak. It’s in the gold mining space. Full margin. And if everybody’s gonna be there, we oughta get there first.

So far, we’ve only wanted to own the very best miners with the highest momentum and relative strength readings, like Newmont, for example. But these were the exceptions, not the rule. Now that the Gold Mining Index has broken out, we can expand our horizons and approach the whole space from a broader bullish perspective.

Click on Charts to Zoom In

43 is next, but ultimately I think we get all the way back to 62 and those epic 2011 highs.

The way I tried to explain it to a friend of mine this week was that Gold Miners have organized a killer party: Caterers, band, open bar, magicians, the whole thing. They went all out for this.

What I mean by that is, this party took a long time to plan. You can’t just send out invites and put all this together over night. This is a process. You need like a party planning committee and stuff to do this right.

In fact, this party took almost a decade to organize. We know a lot of people who got tossed around in that mess this whole time, while everyone else was having fun elsewhere. NOW, we’re the ones that show up, a little fashionably late, looking good and refreshed, and ready for a good time.

What’s important to remember here through, is that when you arrive to this party, that you understand who’s already here. There are folks who look like they just went through war. They’ve been organizing this party for so long and have lost so much, both monetarily and emotionally, that they’re punch drunk at this point. They don’t know the difference. They’re not seeing clearly. What’s another keg stand or couple of shots at this point?

This is what it looks like if you were one of these early arrivers over the past decade. You missed out on all the fun at the house down the block.

Fault Lines – Doug Noland

Now on a weekly basis, we’re witnessing things that couldn’t happen – actually happen.

April 20 – Bloomberg (Catherine Ngai, Olivia Raimonde, and Alex Longley): “Of all the wild, unprecedented swings in financial markets since the coronavirus pandemic broke out, none has been more jaw-dropping than Monday’s collapse in a key segment of U.S. oil trading. The price on the futures contract for West Texas crude that is due to expire Tuesday fell into negative territory — minus $37.63 a barrel.”

For posterity, the latest numbers on U.S. monetary inflation: Federal Reserve Assets expanded $205 billion last week to a record $6.573 TN. Fed Assets surged $2.307 TN, or 56%, in just seven weeks. Asset were up $2.645 TN over the past 33 weeks. M2 “money” supply surged $125bn last week to a record $16.870 TN, with an unprecedented seven-week expansion of $1.362 TN. M2 inflated $2.329 TN, or 16.0%, over the past year. Institutional Money Fund Assets (not included in M2) jumped $123 billion last week. Over seven weeks, Institutional Money Funds were up $845 billion. Combined, M2 and Institutional Money Funds jumped a staggering $2.207 TN over seven weeks ($100bn less than the growth of Fed Assets).


There are these days three critical international Fault Lines – Europe, the emerging markets and China – that were demonstrating heightened fragility even prior to the pandemic’s catastrophic blow. Europe – with its structurally weak economies, fragile banking systems, social and political instability, and vulnerable euro currency regime – is a precarious Fault Line. In particular, COVID-19 is absolutely clobbering Europe’s own internal Fault Line. Spain and Italy trail only the U.S. in global infections. European ministers met again Thursday in an attempt to cobble together some type of agreement for an EU COVID stimulus package.

Italian yields rose five bps this week to 1.84%. There’s more to the story. Yields traded as high as 2.27% in Wednesday trading, up 48 bps in three sessions to the high since global markets were “seizing up” back on March 18th. Heading into Thursday’s EU emergency meeting, yields were up across Europe’s periphery. At Wednesday’s trading highs, a three-session surge had yields up 37 bps in Spain, 36 bps in Portugal, and 50 bps in Greece.

April 23 – Associated Press (Lorne Cook and Raf Casert): “European Union leaders agreed Thursday to revamp the EU’s long-term budget and set up a massive recovery fund to tackle the impact of the coronavirus and help rebuild the 27-nation bloc’s ravaged economies, but deep differences remain over the best way to achieve those goals… But the leaders did agree to task the European Commission with revamping the EU’s next seven-year budget — due to enter force on Jan. 1 but still the subject of much disagreement — and devise a massive recovery plan. While no figure was put on that plan, officials believe that 1-1.5 trillion euros ($1.1-1.6 trillion) would be needed.”

April 23 – Bloomberg (Birgit Jennen): “German Chancellor Angela Merkel called for a Europe-wide economic stimulus program to be financed by the European Union’s budget, making a national appeal that helping partners would be good for Germany. ‘A European growth program could support an upswing over the next two years, and we’ll work for that,’ Merkel said in a speech to the lower house of parliament in Berlin… ‘We want to act quickly in Europe, and we of course need instruments to be able to quickly deal with the effects of the crisis in all member states.’ She urged German lawmakers to move fast to make a planned 500 billion euros ($540bn) in EU spending available as soon as June 1.”

EU ministers, once again, kicked the can down the road – which spurred an immediate decline in periphery yields. Who will pay for massive – Trillion plus – stimulus spending plans – other than the ECB? Italy came into this crisis with national debt-to-GDP approaching 140%. In a likely scenario of GDP contracting 10% – and with debt surging at least 20% this year and growing rapidly again next year – it’s not long before Italy is facing an unmanageable 200% of GDP debt load. Conservative estimates have Portugal government debt expanding to 146% of GDP this year and Greece to 219%.

Italy’s weak coalition government is arguing for the EU to issue system-wide “coronabonds,” then employing these funds for grants to troubled nations. Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and other “northern” nations remain adamantly opposed to debt mutualization.

The Conti government is warning EU officials that Italy cannot handle a surge in debt issuance – and will not put its citizens through Greek-style austerity and debt restructuring.  I view Germans and Italians sharing a common currency as unsustainable over the longer-term. I have expected hardship that would accompany the piercing of the global Bubble to again place European monetary integration at risk. Italy’s deteriorating circumstance risks sparking public support for exiting the euro.

April 24 – Bloomberg (Alessandra Migliaccio): “Italy’s credit grade was left unchanged by S&P Global Ratings, which said the nation’s diversified and wealthy economy, net external creditor position and low levels of private debt partly offset the drag from high public leverage. The BBB rating is still just two notches above junk, and S&P kept its negative outlook, which means the risk of a downgrade remains. The country’s financial position has been severely weakened by the cost of dealing with the coronavirus… The country’s rating could be lowered if the ratio between government debt and gross domestic product ‘fails to shift onto a clearly discernible downward path over the next three years, or if there is a marked deterioration in borrowing conditions that jeopardizes the sovereign’s public finance sustainability,’ S&P said.”

COVID-19 will hasten the loss of confidence in myriad institutions. The rating agencies will not go unscathed. Italy investment-grade? Only massive ECB purchases have kept debt service costs manageable. And who would purchase Italian bonds today if not for the unstoppable ECB backstop? What are the ramifications for the ECB loading up on such unsound debt?

The euro traded down to almost 1.07 vs. the dollar in Friday trading – near one-month lows. A euro breaking lower on heightened concerns for periphery debt and euro zone integration would only add fuel to the dollar’s upside dislocation. The dollar index was back above 100 this week. With king dollar already benefiting from the U.S.’s competitive advantage in fiscal and monetary stimulus, an additional push from a euro crisis would place only more pressure on faltering EM currencies (including the renminbi).

The Brazilian real’s 6.2% drop this the week increased y-t-d losses to 27.8%. Brazil’s local currency bond yields surged 167 bps this week to 8.77%. Dollar-denominated yields surged 40 bps to 5.04%, the high since March 19th. Brazil’s Credit default swap prices surged 78 bps to 368 bps, the high since March 31st – and only 14 bps below the closing high from March 18th. Brazilian stocks sank 5.5% in Friday’s selloff, increasing y-t-d declines to 34.9%. Ominously, Banco do Brasil sank 15.6% this week, boosting 2020 losses to 54%. Banco Bradesco fell 14.5% (down 48.5% y-t-d). Brazil as an EM crisis Fault Line?

April 24 – UK Guardian (Dom Phillips): “Brazil’s government has been plunged into turmoil after the resignation of one of Jair Bolsonaro’s most powerful ministers sparked protests, calls for the president’s impeachment and an investigation into claims he had improperly interfered in the country’s federal police. In a rambling televised address…, Brazil’s embattled president denied claims from his outgoing justice minister Sérgio Moro that he had sought to appoint a new federal police chief in order to gain access to secret intelligence reports… ‘Sorry Mr Minister, you won’t make a liar of me,’ Bolsonaro declared… Moro’s bombshell allegations sparked pot-banging protests and an immediate outcry among Brazil’s political class, with Brazil’s prosecutor-general Augusto Aras requesting supreme court permission to launch an investigation. ‘Moro’s testimony … constitutes strong evidence for an impeachment process,’ tweeted Flávio Dino, the leftist governor of the northeastern state of Maranhão.”

This week’s EM currency weakness wasn’t limited to Brazil. The Mexican peso sank 5.1%, with y-t-d losses up to 24.2%. The Colombian peso was down 2.5%, the South Korean won 1.4%, the Hungarian forint 1.4%, and the South African rand 1.2%. Notable y-t-d EM currency declines include the South African rand’s 26.5%, Colombian peso’s 19.0%, Russian ruble’s 16.9%, Turkish lira’s 14.7%, Chilean peso’s 12.5%, Hungarian forint’s 10.4%, Indonesian Rupiah’s 10.0%, Argentine peso’s 9.9% and Czech koruna’s 9.7%.

EM booms were a central facet of the global bubble, thriving from a confluence of overheated domestic credit systems and booming Chinese demand and credit excess, along with unparalleled leveraged speculation and international inflows.

In past cycles, international speculative flows would gravitate freely into EM booms, only to eventually be trapped by collapsing currencies, illiquidity and capital controls – come the arrival of the bust. After the most protracted of booms, I believe a historic bust has commenced. The shocking precision of COVID-19 strikes on the susceptible – this week in Brazil.

Collapsing EM currency and bond prices were key aspects of March’s “seizing up” of global markets. Central bank policy measures – including the Fed’s expanded international swap arrangements – along with the global rally have somewhat stabilized “developing” markets. Yet EM remains the global financial system’s weak link. EM has added unprecedented amounts of debt during this long cycle, too much dollar-denominated. Widespread debt restructuring and defaults seem unavoidable.

EM now faces a very difficult road ahead. “Hot money” outflows have commenced, currencies have faltered, and bond markets have turned unstable. Acute financial and economic fragilities have begun to surface.

Importantly, EM central banks lack the flexibility to employ monetary stimulus to the extent enjoyed by the major central banks. Liquidity injections risk exacerbating outflows and currency crises, at the same time stoking inflationary pressures and bond yields. Sinking EM currencies and bond prices then incite panicked “hot money” outflows, dislocation and financial crisis.

To make a bad situation worse, aggressive stimulus by the Fed bolsters U.S. Treasuries and securities markets, drawing international flows to king dollar. The stronger dollar then further pressures EM currencies and stokes de-risking/deleveraging dynamics.

EM has entered what I expect will be a deep multiyear downcycle, with far-reaching market, financial, economic, social and geopolitical ramifications. Emerging market economies, certainly including China, played a powerful role as the “global locomotive” pulling the world out of the previous crisis period. They will now act as a major economic drag – and a Fault Line for global financial crisis.

Recession and depressions

By George Friedman apr21 2020

A recession is an essential part of the business cycle. Among other things it culls the weaker businesses and redistributes capital and labor for better uses. It is painful but necessary and it ends as it began, as a function of a healthy economy.

Depressions are not economic events; they are the result of exogenous forces such as wars or disease. Depressions are not a necessary culling but a byproduct of the savage destruction of these external forces, which not only disrupt but destroy vast parts of humanity and decency, along with the economy. Therefore, the question of whether we are now in a depression or recession is not an academic question but the single most important question that humanity faces. We will recover from a recession. We will recover from a depression as well, but it will take much longer and involve far more pain.

Depressions are economic events not created by economic forces. Therefore, measuring the depth of a depression by economic measures alone is insufficient. The measure of a depression is the extent to which it will destroy the hopes and dreams of a generation, making what had been in easy reach inconceivably far away, and taking successful people and reducing them to penury. Like many things, the face of depression is readily recognized even if it is difficult to quantify. Among other things, if for example an economy were to contract by 30 percent, recovering from that by, say, a 4 percent growth rate would not be a triumph but a confirmation that we would be beginning to climb out of depression.

The United States emerged from its last depression in World War II, so it has been almost a century since we have experienced one, and the one that we experienced arose from war and was solved by war. World War I created a massive depression in most of Europe. Germany was particularly savaged by the Treaty of Versailles, but Britain, Russia and Poland were also wrecked in different ways. The cause of the depression was that over four years at least 20 million Europeans, for the most part the next generation, had died. For four years the economy was focused on building weapons and ammunition. Shell-shocked soldiers came home to shell-shocked nations, an industrial plan irrelevant to anything but war, and the thanks of their fellow citizens. They did not come back to the futures they had imagined, but then those who did not go to war had their futures shattered as well.

Economists like to point to periods during the 1920s when the economy grew, but sporadic growth does nothing to affect my definition of depression. The term “lost generation” came about to refer to the cynical intellectuals who arose in the 1920s, but it more accurately describes, for example, the soldier who had hoped to own a shoe store but now found himself in a country where shoes were no longer bought but only mended.

This was not unique to any one country, save the United States, which fought for only a year and came home to a country able to produce the engines of war and the men who manned them, and all the food that could be imagined. For the most part their dreams were kept alive, for a while. But the persistence of the European depression meant that the U.S. could not resume its role as exporter. Instead, Europeans who had jobs at lower wages than the Americans undersold American products in the U.S. Washington’s response was a tariff on European goods that changed the structure of global trade, and added the United States to the list of casualties. I won’t trouble you with the details of the American depression. One of the characteristics of the greatest generation was that, having gone through the depression, they saw World War II as their great hope.

Depressions become a political event. There are those who do well in such times and want to preserve the depression. There are others too rich or poor to know that there is a depression underway. And there are those politicians who either invoke ancient ideology irrelevant to the moment, pretending to know what to do and figuring that no one will notice that they don’t, and a few who know that in a crisis the people will rally to those who actually care and plan.

One of these latter politicians was Lenin. Russia was utterly shattered. The leaders didn’t care. Lenin did and knew what to do. He famously said that you can’t make a pie without breaking the crust. To speed things up, he ordered bakeries to bake only crusts for breaking, forgetting the pie. But there was little to be done with Russia.

In Germany, a leader emerged who recognized that unemployment was the heart of the problem and presented fascism as the solution, along with something vital: someone to blame. He nationalized the economy while leaving business in place, and nominated the Jews as the villains, to wild applause.

These are the people who come out of depressions. The successful are monsters; the decent can’t control the forces that depressions unleash. Roosevelt’s New Deal helped some but didn’t change the reality. World War II offered the greatest stimulus package of all time. Depressions create desperate people hungry for everything — above all, some hope for a future. Hitler and Lenin were one kind of leader; Roosevelt and the other European leaders were another kind. In the end, the solution was not found by the Federal Reserve but the military.

World War II did not end the depression, save for in the United States. Europe was once again in depression. China and Japan were ruined. When I was a child, the words “Made in Japan” brought laughter and the expectation of cheap and trashy goods. The solution came because the Americans feared the Soviets and created aid packages for allies and the right to sell cheap goods to the U.S. The skilled workers of Eurasia were either led into a generational depression by the Soviets or into recovery by the Americans. Again, depressions and the possibility of war went hand in hand.

The coronavirus crisis has similarities to war. The state mobilizes the people heedless of consequences. The workforce, or a large part of it, is diverted from its work. Schools are closed. Most of all, we are afraid. Even the question of how the virus began has hints of retaliation assigned to it. The enemy is death, in this case from the virus. We duck and cover, and in a war, the rule is that there is no price too high to be paid for victory.

But victory in war and victory against the coronavirus are very different. This leads us to ask what victory in this case should look like. The virus should go away, on its own or from a vaccine. And the world should return to what it was. Yet the problem of war and depression is that the world doesn’t go back to what it was. It is very different, and in its mildest form it causes the survivors to change their dreams — but most important they will still have dreams. They will not have to abandon their right to dreams.

So those are the questions of the moment. First, will the virus be defeated or go away? If it remains, will we accept the permanence of the new disease or will we conduct a war that will transform the world in unknown ways? Second, is this like the depression after World War I, a global crisis? We Americans do not control how the world will react to the choice we have made, and decisions by Canada or Italy could affect how we live.

For what it is worth, I don’t think we have reached the depression point. I don’t think the numbers show it yet, and the despair of depression is not here yet. But some part of the world may have reached that point, and depression spreads its claws. The urgency on vaccines and openings I think reflects a sense of fear of reaching the breaking point, but as I have written in my book about the United States, we are a uniquely inventive people, and this is in the end a technical problem.

Still, it is useful to bear in mind the past. When we look at the first half of the 20th century, the economy was a prisoner of war, and contrary to the histories of the time, it was not economic theory that defined things. But the political systems made the decision on the price to be paid, and the price was enormous in terms of death. In all of this equation, the dark reality is that solving this without accepting death will be difficult — unless the medical profession has an emergency mode.

Conversations with my favourite Technical Analyst

I think it is way to early to take a call based on fundamentals but if you get some help from capital flows and technical analysis you get more inputs for decision making.

Today I had a discussion on state of markets with Neppolian of Jade Finance and Management Advisors LLP

Summary

I feel now Corona and Crude will no more act as fear factors or reasons for any ensuing fall . Corona and Crude oil are HISTORY. We should not focus on them anymore.

Could there be any other  lurking Blackswan ….possible and we can remain open about them.

Technically markets are at levels both price wise and time wise (faster retracement in half the time of fall). They should  start weakening from coming week ideally.  We can remain with bear case till then.

However if they don’t start falling from coming week, then we should be prepared for more melt up in markets. We must slacken our bear case. On a non technical basis,  am very very clear that all the money printing that has happened across the globe (excluding India) is inflationary by nature….and equities should do good in an inflationary environment along with gold.

I feel markets can now only come down purely based on technical reasons or if the world has under printed to not fully cover the economic impact.

My view is if the world is moving towards either inflation or reflation then the most money will be made in cyclicals like metals, industrials etc.

I also feel industry facing banks should do better than retail customers facing banks

Chemical and Fertilizer stocks should do better than FMCG

Disclaimer: This is not an investment advice. Please do your own do diligence by “Watching CNBC” before you take any investment decisions